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The Covid-19 pandemic has tested the legal, political, economic and public health
systems of countries all over the world, and Singapore – particularly as it found itself
having to hold a general election in the middle of the pandemic – is no exception.
However, it does seem that the pandemic has created opportunities for consolidation
of democracy in Singapore as a result of increased citizen-state interactions during
this time.
The Executive and Use of Powers in Response to
Emergency
Singapore’s “legislative approach” in countering the outbreak of Covid-19
assiduously avoids invoking emergency powers and even the more drastic
terminology of a “lockdown”. The Covid-19 (Temporary Measures) Act (CTMA),
passed on an urgent basis, was more wide-ranging than the existing Infectious
Diseases Act, which had already been shored up to deal with the SARS outbreak in
2003. CTMA granted broad powers to the Minister of Health to enact control orders
if satisfied that “the incidence and transmission of COVID-19 in the community
in Singapore constitutes a serious threat to public health” and that the control
order is “necessary or expedient” to supplement other legislation, particularly the
Infectious Diseases Act. It also provides, notwithstanding existing legislation, for
court proceedings using remote conferencing technology. In the private law realm,
the law also introduced critical temporary measures granting relief to financially
distressed individuals and businesses, amending statutes such as the Bankruptcy
Act and the Companies Act.
The Ministry of Health enacted subsidiary legislation, the COVID-19 (Temporary
Measures) (Control Order) Regulations 2020 (Regulations), the very same day,
the effect of which were previously summarised here. Singapore ended its “circuit
breaker” (the government avoided the term “lockdown”) on 2 June 2020, entering
into “Phase 2” of its schedule of restrictions easing. “Phase 3” commenced on 28
December 2020, with the Regulations amended each time to reflect the updated
measures.
Legislative and Judicial Oversight
The Health Ministry’s broad regulatory powers under CTMA are checked by (i)
subjecting all control orders to parliamentary oversight, including by requiring all
control orders and amendments thereto to be presented to Parliament “as soon as
possible”; and (ii) prescribing a one-year time limit from the entry into force of the
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relevant provisions. (This time limit on the Health Minister’s powers is twice as long
as the six months validity the Constitution grants to Proclamations of Emergency.)
This means that the Regulations will expire on 7 April 2021, unless extended by
Parliament.
Neither CTMA nor the Regulations provide specific recourse mechanisms against
state authorities in relation to the promulgation or enforcement of control orders, but
the usual administrative law rules and remedies are likely to apply. It remains to be
seen how the courts will interpret s 35(8) of CTMA, which provides that enforcement
officers bear no legal liability so long as they act in “good faith and with reasonable
care”, should the issue arise. Preliminarily, it seems likely that it will be characterised
as an immunity clause (which does not exclude the courts’ jurisdiction or authority to
act) and not a clause ousting judicial review, quite apart from the question of whether
ouster clauses are constitutional.
Whereas similar measures in some countries have encountered protests and
resistance, there has been little vocal opposition in Singapore. In this sense, the
situation in Singapore is much like that in South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. The
question of “why” is a complex one beyond the scope of this post, and indeed
beyond the realm of law. As a starting point, and as previously argued, it would be
too simplistic to attribute this to “authoritarianism”. It is important to note that the
legitimacy of these measures has hinged not only on their legal basis, but, perhaps
more importantly, on the government’s proactive strategy of communication. At the
highest political level, the Prime Minister addressed the population at nearly every
major stage of the evolution of the public health situation and of government policy.
Relevant ministers and bureaucrats gave regular press briefings. The government
also set up a WhatsApp channel (with currently over a million subscribers) and a
Telegram channel to send updates directly to members of the public, including daily
details of new, discharged, critical, and recovering Covid-19 cases. These channels
have allowed the government to manage the flow of credible information and counter
the spread of any problematic false information on the pandemic rapidly.
Parliamentary Democracy: Consolidation
The pandemic could be said to have ushered in a more robust form of democratic
government in Singapore. We observe this in four ways.
The first is the commitment of the government to ensuring the continued functioning
of Parliament. Parliament is not only an organ of democracy, but, in parliamentary
democracies, also its most visible symbol. Its continued functioning is existential.
Crucially therefore, in May 2020, the Singapore Parliament amended the
Constitution to create a mechanism for meetings to take place with members in
different places but in contemporaneous communication – arguably procedurally
extraordinary but substantively limited. All members of Parliament, including those
in the opposition, voted unanimously for the amendments. The Amendment Bill
provided that this mechanism would be active for six months after it came into
force, and that it can be subsequently activated for six months at a time if members
consider that it is impossible, unsafe or inexpedient for Parliament to meet in one
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place. The mechanism was used for the first time at the Opening of Parliament
following the July 2020 parliamentary elections (more below). The mechanism has
since lapsed after the six months mark, and Parliament will have to reactivate the
mechanism if necessary in the future.
Secondly, unlike in some countries where emergency proclamations delayed
elections, Singapore organised general elections on 10 July 2020, some nine
months before the current Parliament’s term expired. Critics may argue that this
is opportunistic, especially in light of calls by some opposition leaders for general
elections to be delayed in light of the pandemic. However, with the end of the
pandemic not in sight, even today, this was perhaps not the most objectionable
timing. In calling the election, the Prime Minister specifically highlighted the need
to seek a new mandate to respond to Covid-19 and its consequences. Measures
were taken to address limitations arising from Covid-19. The Parliamentary Elections
(COVID-19 Special Arrangements) Act was passed to allow political candidates, if ill,
to file nomination papers electronically, and to allow voters subject to control orders
to vote at facilities outside their electoral divisions. These measures have limited
temporal remit; “election” is defined in the Act as “an election… held on or before 14
April 2021”. An urgent constitutional challenge arguing that calling the election in the
middle of a pandemic was contrary to the right to vote was dismissed ex tempore by
Singapore’s highest court.
Thirdly, the 2020 election is widely seen as a watershed election, with the largest
opposition party winning 10 seats in Parliament, the highest number won by an
opposition party in Singapore’s post-independence history. This prompted the
establishment of a formal office of the Leader of the Opposition, heralding an even
more robust role for the opposition going forward. There was some handwringing
within the incumbent party, which won 61.2% of the vote – a solid victory by any
global standard, but which represented a nearly 9% drop from its share in the last
election (in 2015), and just slightly above its record low of 60.1% (in 2011). Further
study is needed on exactly how and to what extent Covid-19 affected the election
outcome, but preliminary data shows that it was likely a key election issue.
Lastly, citizens appear to be more engaged in political matters during this period,
raising dissent that has eventually led to changes in policy. For instance, the debates
in Parliament as to constitutional amendments to allow continuity arrangements
(above) revived the question of livestreaming parliamentary proceedings, hitherto a
contested proposition within and outside Parliament, generally along party lines. This
appears to have led to the livestreaming of parliamentary proceedings for the first
time, garnering more than 80,000 views.
Another important debate that was revived during this time addresses the rights of
overseas voters. With 17 days between the writ of election and polling day, overseas
Singaporeans outside the 10 cities with designated overseas polling stations
found it nigh-impossible to cast their votes given travel restrictions and quarantine
requirements. A group of them urged the government to examine alternatives that
would enable them to vote in the election. The spotlight on the voting obstacles
faced by overseas Singaporeans revived debates as to the nature and scope of the
right to vote within Singapore’s constitutional framework.
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A Matter of Trust: Civil Liberties without Rights-
Adjudication
Unlike in some countries, where courts were asked to adjudicate upon questions
of whether Covid-19 measures violated constitutional and internationally protected
rights, there were no such efforts in Singapore. Any discontent was directed at
efficacy of the measures, rather than questioning whether the social-distancing
and mask-wearing restrictions were necessary. The legitimacy of government and
its actions in Singapore is largely based on its performance. Such performance
legitimacy however requires a strong relationship of trust between the people and
the government. These complex dynamics of performance legitimacy and trust in
Singapore’s semi-competitive dominant-party democracy was laid bare in the public
backlash and the government’s response to the use of contact tracing data.
After months of promising that data collected by a contact tracing technology
called “TraceTogether” would only be used, where necessary, for contact tracing
purposes, it was subsequently revealed during parliamentary question time that
the data remains subject to the generally applicable Criminal Procedure Code. This
means that the data could be used in criminal investigations, and had in fact been
used in investigations in one murder case. The public outrage was swift and loud –
reflecting a sense of betrayal of trust. The government first sought to address this by
clarifying that the data would only be used for “very serious offences” as a matter of
police discretion. Subsequently, presumably because this was thought insufficient
to assuage public sentiment, the government promised to introduce expedited
legislation to this effect.
A World Apart: Low-Wage Migrant Workers
The Covid-19 outbreak also brought to the fore public discussion on the living
conditions of migrant workers in Singapore. Despite Singapore’s early success in
containing its spread, it was the rapid increase of Covid-19 cases in the crowded
dormitories, in which most of Singapore’s 350,0000 low-wage migrants who work in
the construction and marine shipyard sectors live, that essentially forced Singapore
to adopt the “circuit breaker” measures introduced by the CTMA. In fact, 93% of
Singapore’s approximately 59,000 Covid-19 cases to date have affected migrant
workers. 47% of workers in dormitories have suffered from Covid-19, as compared
to a 0.25% rate among the rest of the population. Despite an early government
statement that migrant workers are “generally young, and thus much less likely to
become seriously ill with COVID-19”, at least one medical study has documented
catastrophic long-term illnesses among some migrant workers who were initially
asymptomatic – consistent with a growing body of medical knowledge on potential
long-term effects of Covid-19.
The crisis prompted the Prime Minister to directly address migrant workers in
his addresses to the nation, promising “we will care for you, just like we care for
Singaporeans”. This message was reinforced in an unprecedented address on
International Migrants’ Day, describing migrant workers as “members of our society”.
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To our knowledge, this was the first time a political leader directly addressed migrant
workers as a constituency, for whose welfare Singapore’s leaders are responsible.
In light of the longstanding premise of Singapore’s migrant labour regime as based
on developmentalist and law-and-order logics, rather than on migrant workers as
rights-holders, this is significant. The government recently announced that all migrant
workers, like citizens and long-term residents, will receive Covid-19 vaccinations
free-of-charge (albeit this would arguably have been necessitated by public health
policy in any case). Nonetheless, more will need to be done to ensure that migrant
workers are not disproportionately burdened by Covid-19 measures, including
being subjected to more onerous controls than the rest of the population (as they
currently are, under post-“circuit breaker” amendments to the Employment of Foreign
Manpower (Work Pass) Regulations, rather than CTMA). There are serious concerns
that prolonged lockdowns (among other factors) have taken a toll on the mental
health of migrant workers, including leading to self-harm and suicides.
Conclusion: Who is the Political Community?
Whereas the pandemic has resulted in political upheaval and even democratic
backsliding in many countries, Singapore’s legal and political institutions have
generally proven resilient, and the crises presented by Covid-19 have arguably
raised political consciousness and encouraged citizens to be more participatory. It
should also encourage Singapore to confront more fundamental questions as to the
nature of its democracy and the identity of its political community. More than one
million foreigners work in Singapore, of whom nearly a million are low-wage migrants
on Work Permits, out of a total population of 5.69 million. Many Singaporean families
now include non-citizen members. Besides migrant workers in dormitories, the
pandemic also spotlighted the long-existing vulnerabilities of other key communities,
such as foreign domestic workers, and migrant wives without long-term residence
rights in Singapore. In the starkly interconnected world that globalisation has built
and Covid-19 has thrown into sharp relief, democracy may require interrogating what
it means to live together and what we owe to one another, in a manner faithful to the
dignity of the human person. It may well be that, ultimately, we are only as strong as
our most vulnerable.
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